'FM 6-0 Commander and Staff Organization and Operations', is a US Army field manual, formerly inaccessible to public, but now it is. FM 6-0 was intended as a planning tool for battalion sized units and larger.
It seems the book has rendered itself obsolete. The reason is obvious: conventional warfare is not foreseeable in near future. In 1970s, we used to find passages in publication as to the necessity of small wars rather than launching WWIII. Then we heard of Globalization, integration or rather migration of people, within cities or abroad, UN Agenda 21.
As far as memory remembers, wars have always relied on secrecy and deceptions. If you reveal your new weapons, accordingly, you are lying. Chapter 11 of the said manual is dedicated to 'Military Deception' which is applicable during any phase of military operations in order to create conditions to accomplish the commander's intent. When a US president publicly announced that he would pull back US forces from Iraq or Afghanistan he was telling the truth but this truth backfired. The news was a green light to the terrorist to expand their agenda. Soon advisors chastised the president for his naivety. The president had to take back his words. It was an instance of failure of an inexperienced civilian to assume the grand task of Commander-in-Chief.
To Defeat ISIS, you need to put boots on the Ground. US at the time of Obama was refraining from getting American servicemen killed in foreign lands. Now what? We are familiar with the rangers, special forces, airborne units and green berets. But these soldiers are servicemen with no religious agenda. A green beret is not in a hurry to get killed so that his bullet-ridden body will be transported on the back of angels to have an audience with the Moon god to be healed on the spot and taken to Garden of Eden, where numerous dark-eyed (woman) or ḥūrīyah females and sex boys leaning on beds that are placed on the bank of a crystal clear river augmented with dry liquor! A green beret is trained to carry out his mission professionally. He evaluates the risks involved in his mission. Presently US forces are severely bugged down by many restrictive procedures which prevent them from fighting a major battle.
Islamists as of 600 A. D. have shown that they do not respect any conventional rules of battle non-battle. In all battles they have fought, Islamists have acted disorderly and erratically resulting confusion among the regular army of Sassanid and Eastern Romans, both ending in shameful defeat.
Presently, terrorist refuse to wear uniforms; they blend in with the civilian population; they do not wear any insignia to reveal them as members of a terrorist militia. They gather in mosques (Muslim place of worship), around hospitals, and even in private homes. They use ambulances to carry lethal weapons.
A US infantryman routinely carries between 60 and 100 pounds of gear including body armor, weapons and batteries. A terrorist is very light; even they do not wear helmets or bullet proof vests. How can a heavy loaded infantryman chase a light-weight terrorist?
Restrictive Rules of Engagement keep US from winning. Here you are with an instance, of course, quoted from the link below: 'The mission was simple: to search the village and kill or capture identified members of al-Qaeda. It was the kind of mission that the troopers had executed countless times before. It wasn't uncommon to encounter "squirters" - small groups of insurgents who try to sneak or race through American lines and disappear into the desert. Sometimes they were on motorcycles, sometimes on foot, but often they were in cars, armed to the teeth and ready to fight to the death. ... This evening, however, our troopers believed that the car ahead wasn't full of civilians. The driver was too skilled, his tactics too knowing for a carload of shepherds. As the car disappeared into the night, the senior officer on the scene radioed for permission to fire. His request went to the TOC, the tactical operations center, which is the beating heart of command and control in the battlefield environment. There the "battle captain," or the senior officer in the chain of command, would decide - shoot or don't shoot. If soldiers opened fire after a lawyer had deemed the attack outside the rules, they would risk discipline - even prosecution. But first there was a call for the battle captain to make, all the way to brigade headquarters, where a JAG officer - an Army lawyer - was on call 24 hours a day, seven days a week. His job was to analyze the request, apply the governing rules of engagement, and make a recommendation to the chain of command. While the commander made the ultimate decision, he rarely contradicted JAG recommendations. After all, if soldiers opened fire after a lawyer had deemed the attack outside the rules, they would risk discipline - even prosecution - if the engagement went awry. Acting on the best available information - including a description of the suspect vehicle, a description of its tactics, analysis of relevant intelligence, and any available video feeds - the JAG officer had to determine whether there was sufficient evidence of "hostile intent" to authorize the use of deadly force. He had to make a life-or-death decision in mere minutes. In this case, the lawyer said no - insufficient evidence. No deadly force. Move to detain rather than shoot to kill. The commander deferred. No shot. Move to detain. So the chase continued, across roads and open desert. The suspect vehicle did its best to shake free, but at last it was cornered by converging American forces. There was no escape. Four men emerged from the car. American soldiers dismounted from their MRAPs, and with one man in the lead, weapons raised, they ordered the Iraqis to surrender. Those who were in the TOC that night initially thought someone had stepped on a land mine. Watching on video feed, they saw the screen go white, then black. For several agonizing minutes, no one knew what had happened. Then the call came. Suicide bomber. One of the suspects had self-detonated, and Americans were hurt. One badly - very badly. Despite desperate efforts to save his life, he died just before he arrived at a functioning aid station. Another casualty of the rules of engagement.
A Humvee reinforced with extra armor was blown into the air. FourAmericans died. One soldier miraculously escaped, but with crippling, life-altering injuries. The IED cell had struck again. The effects continued. Within weeks of the IED strike, the cell ambushed another American patrol - this time with elements of the al-Qaeda group firing from, yes, a mosque. One American was seriously injured, and the resulting firefight lasted 36 hours, inflicting massive damage. Much of the village was destroyed as American and al-Qaeda troops traded fire, locked in house-to-house combat. The rules of engagement saved a mosque but destroyed a village - and likely four more American lives.
Read more at: http://www.nationalreview.com/article/428756/rules-engagement-need-reform